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Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and the General Court
Reported Period 01.12.2017–17.04.2018
Compiled and edited by Lorenzo Squintani
Senior Lecturer in European and Economic Law and the University  
of  Groningen, the Netherlands
l.squintani@rug.nl
 Overview of the Judgments1
 On the Requirement of Having an Interest to Start Proceeding  
against eu Law
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 December 2017 in Case C-268/16 
P – Binca Seafoods GmbH
 Subject Matter
This case concerns an appeal by Binca Seafoods GmbH against the judgment of 
the General Court of 11 March 2016 in case T-94/15, in which the General Court 
rejected the request of annulment by Binca Seafoods against Commission Imple-
menting Regulation (eu) No. 1358/2014 amending Regulation (ec) No. 889/2008, 
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (ec) No. 
834/2007, as regards the origin of organic aquaculture animals, aquaculture hus-
bandry practices, feed for organic aquaculture animals and products and sub-
stances allowed for use in organic aquaculture. According to the General Court, 
1 Only judgements and orders available on Curia.eu under the subject matter ‘environment’ 
have been included in this report.
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Binca Seafoods did not have an interest to proceed. The Court of Justice clearly 
has a different meaning.
 Judgment
The Court of Justice sets aside the order of the General Court of the European 
Union of 11 March 2016, Binca Seafoods v Commission (T-94/15, eu:t:2016:164) 
and refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union.
 Sharpening the Aarhus Rights
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 20 December 2017 in Case 
C-664/15 – Protect Natur-, Arten- und Landschaftsschutz Umweltorganisation v 
Bezirkshauptmannschaft Gmünd
On this case see the Case Note by Ch. Sobotta in this jeepl issue
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 4 of 
Directive 2000/60/ec establishing a framework for Community action in the field 
of water policy (Water framework Directive), and of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention. The request has been made in proceedings between Protect  Natur-, 
Arten- und Landschaftsschutz Umweltorganisation (Protect) and Bezirkshaupt-
mannschaft Gmünd (Gmünd district authority, Austria) concerning Protect’s 
 application seeking to secure status as a party to the procedure relating to a re-
quest by Aichelberglift Karlstein GmbH for the extension of a permit for a snow-
making facility granted pursuant to legislation governing water-related matters. 
That authority rejected Protect’s request and objections on the ground that it 
had not claimed that any rights protected under the legislation governing water- 
related matters had been affected, and, for that reason, it could not claim to be a 
 party in the procedure. The national court hearing the case wanted to know, in 
 essence, whether a breach of Article 4 of the Water Framework Directive triggers the 
 applicability of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Moreover, it wanted to have 
clarifications on the meaning of the rights established under the  latter  provision, 
and their force to be relied upon to set aside allegedly conflicting  national rules.
 Key Findings
41 Since, by its earlier decision, the national competent authority decided, 
on the basis of an impact assessment in respect of a project on a site pro-
tected under Directive 92/43, that that project would not adversely affect 
the integrity of that site, within the meaning of Article 6(3) of that direc-
tive, it could also follow that that project may not have a significant effect 
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on the environment within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus 
Convention, so that the later decision, taken in the light of the legislation 
governing water-related matters, does not fall within the scope of Article 
6 of that convention nor, consequently, to that extent, within the scope of 
Article 9(2) thereof.
42 However, that is so only if the referring court is in a position to satisfy 
itself that it is, in fact, ruled out that the project at issue may have a sig-
nificant adverse effect on the state of the water forming the subject of the 
permit procedure at issue in the main proceedings.
43 It is only if, following its verification, the referring court had to find that 
such a significant adverse effect was ruled out, that it would follow that 
the question whether, in the present case, an environmental organisa-
tion, such as Protect, has a right to bring proceedings against a decision 
to grant a permit for a project likely to be contrary to the obligation to 
prevent the deterioration of the status of water under Article 4 of Direc-
tive 2000/60 would have to be assessed in the light of Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention.
52 By thus denying environmental organisations any right to bring an action 
against such a decision to grant a permit, the relevant national procedur-
al law is contrary to the requirements flowing from a combined reading 
of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention and Article 47 of the Charter.
57 Any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administra-
tive or judicial practice that might impair the effectiveness of eu law by 
withholding from the national court with jurisdiction to apply such law 
the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to 
set aside national legislative provisions that might prevent eu rules from 
having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements, 
which are the very essence of eu law (see, inter alia, judgments of 9 March 
1978, Simmenthal, 106/77, eu:c:1978:49, paragraph 22, and of 5 April 2016, 
pfe, C 689/13, eu:c:2016:199, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
81 Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the second question is that 
the combined provisions of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, Arti-
cle 47 of the Charter and Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/60 must be inter-
preted as precluding national procedural rules that deprive, in situations 
such as that in question in the main action, environmental organisations 
of the right to participate, as a party to the procedure, in a permit proce-
dure that is intended to implement Directive 2000/60 and limit the right 
to bring proceedings contesting decisions resulting from such procedure 
solely to persons who do have that status.
101 Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the third question is that, 
subject to verification by the referring court of the relevant matters of 
Downloaded from Brill.com03/04/2019 09:36:52AM
via Universiteit Groningen
Squintani
journal for european environmental & planning law 15 (2018) 219-239
<UN>
222
fact and national law, Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention, 
read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted 
as precluding, in a situation such as that in question in the main action, a 
national procedural rule that imposes a time limit on an environmental 
organisation, pursuant to which a person loses the status of party to the 
procedure and therefore cannot bring an action against the decision re-
sulting from that procedure if it failed to submit objections in good time 
following the opening of the administrative procedure and, at the very 
latest, during the oral phase of that procedure.
 Liquid Waste and the Meaning of Emissions under the ets 
Directive
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 18 January 2018 in Case C-58/17 – 
ineos Köln GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 3(h) of 
Commission Decision 2011/278/eu determining transitional Union-wide rules for 
harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of the 
ets Directive. The request has been made in the course of proceedings between 
ineos Köln GmbH (‘ineos’) and Germany, concerning the rejection of the appli-
cation made by ineos for a free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowanc-
es, insofar as that application concerns emissions stemming from the combustion 
of incompletely oxidised carbon contained in liquid waste. The national court 
wanted to know, in essence, whether liquid waste is covered by the ets Directive.
 Key Findings
49 In those circumstances, while it is fully in compliance with the objectives 
pursued by Directive 2003/87 and Decision 2011/278 to take into account 
greenhouse gases generated by the combustion of waste gases containing 
incompletely oxidised carbon, since those emissions cannot be avoided 
and the combustion of those waste gases generally results in their reduc-
tion, it would, by contrast, go against those objectives to take into ac-
count greenhouse gases generated by the combustion of liquid waste 
containing incompletely oxidised carbon because this would result in an 
increase of those emissions, even though they are avoidable.
50 Consequently, it follows both from the general scheme of Directive 
2003/87 and of Decision 2011/278 and from the objectives which they 
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pursue that the emissions generated by the combustion of incompletely 
oxidised carbon contained in liquid waste cannot be taken into account 
in respect of process emissions, within the meaning of Article 3(h)(iv) 
of Decision 2011/278, for the purpose of the free allocation of emission 
allowances pursuant to Article 10 of that decision.
51 Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that 
Article 3(h) of Decision 2011/278 must be interpreted as not precluding 
national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
excludes from the concept of ‘process emissions sub-installation’, within 
the meaning of that provision, greenhouse gas emissions stemming from 
the combustion of incompletely oxidised carbon in a liquid state
 On Greece Persisted Failure to Comply with the eu Provisions on 
Urban Waste-Water Treatment
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 22 February 2018 in Case C-328/16 – 
European Commission v Hellenic Republic
 Subject Matter
This infringement procedure concerns Greece’s failure to adopt the measures 
necessary to comply with the judgment of 24 June 2004, Commission v Greece 
 ( C-119/02), in which the Court held that, by not taking the measures necessary for 
the installation of a collecting system for urban waste water from the Thriasio 
 Pedio area and not subjecting urban waste water from that area to treatment 
more stringent than secondary treatment before its discharge into the sensitive 
area of the Gulf of Eleusina, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obliga-
tions under the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) and Article 5(2) of Direc-
tive 91/271. The Commission accordingly requested the imposition of pecuniar 
penalties.
 Judgment
1. The court declares that, by failing to adopt the measures necessary 
to comply with the judgment of 24 June 2004, Commission v Greece  
(C-119/02, not published, eu:c:2004:385), the Hellenic Republic failed to 
fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) tfeu;
2. Orders that, if the failure to fulfil obligations found in point 1 has continued 
until the day of delivery of the present judgment, the Hellenic  Republic 
be required to pay to the European Commission a penalty payment of 
eur 3 276 000 for each six-month period of delay in  implementing the 
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measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 24 June 2004, Com-
mission v Greece (C-119/02, not published, eu:c:2004:385), from the date 
of delivery of the present judgment until the judgment of 24 June 2004, 
Commission v Greece (C-119/02, not published, eu:c:2004:385), has been 
complied with in full, the actual amount of which must be calculated at 
the end of each six-month period by reducing the total amount relating 
to each of those periods by a percentage corresponding to the proportion 
representing the number of population equivalent units that have actu-
ally been brought into compliance with the judgment of 24 June 2004, 
Commission v Greece (C-119/02, not published, eu:c:2004:385), in the 
 Thriasio Pedio area, at the end of the period in question, in comparison 
to the number of population equivalent units that have not been brought 
into compliance with the judgment of 24 June 2004, Commission v Greece 
(C-119/02, not published, eu:c:2004:385), on the day of delivery of the 
present judgment;
3. Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay to the European Commission a lump 
sum of eur 5 million
 On Cleaner Air for Polish Inhabitants
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 22 February 2018 in Case C-336/16 – 
European Commission v Republic of Poland
 Subject Matter
By its application, the European Commission asked the Court to declare that the 
Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under, respectively,  Articles 
13(1), 22(3) and 23(1) of Directive 2008/50/ec. According to the Commission, in-
deed, since 2007 and up to at least 2013, the daily limit values for particulate 
 matter PM10 were exceeded in 35 zones for the assessment and management of 
ambient air quality and the annual limit values for PM10 were exceeded in 9 zones 
for the assessment and management of ambient air quality, and no information 
has been provided to indicate that this situation has improved. Moreover, no ap-
propriate measures had been adopted, in ambient air quality programmes, to en-
sure that the exceedance period of PM10 limit values is kept as short as possible. 
Besides, the daily limit values, increased by the margin of tolerance, were exceed-
ed from 1 January 2010 to 10 June 2011 in three zones, as well as from 1 January 2011 
to 10 June 2011 in Ostrów-Kępno. Finally, the second subparagraph of Article 23(1) 
of the Directive was not correctly implemented. The Court agrees with the Com-
mission on all allegations.
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 Judgment
The Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under, respective-
ly, Article 13(1), in conjunction with Annex xi, the second subparagraph of 
 Article 23(1), and Article 22(3) of, in conjunction with Annex xi to, Directive 
2008/50/Ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, for the following reasons:
− since 2007 and up to 2015 inclusive, the daily limit values for particulate 
matter PM10 concentrations were exceeded in 35 zones for the assessment 
and management of ambient air quality and the annual limit values for par-
ticulate matter PM10 concentrations were exceeded in 9 zones for the as-
sessment and management of ambient air quality;
− no appropriate measures have been incorporated in ambient air quality 
programmes to ensure that the exceedance period of particulate matter 
PM10 concentrations limit values is kept as short as possible;
− the daily limit values for particulate matter PM10 concentrations in ambient 
air, increased by the margin of tolerance, were exceeded from 1 January 2010 
to 10 June 2011 in the Radom, Pruszków-Żyrardów, Kędzierzyn-Koźle zones, 
as well as from 1 January 2011 to 10 June 2011 in the Ostrów-Kępno zone; and
− the second subparagraph of Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50 was not 
 correctly implemented.
 On the Compatibility of National Procedures for the Correction of 
Emission Allowances Applications under the ets Directive
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 22 February 2018 in Case C-572/16 – 
ineos Köln GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 10a 
of the ets Directive, and of Commission Decision 2011/278/eu determining tran-
sitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission. The re-
quest has been made in proceedings between ineos Köln GmbH (‘ineos’) and 
 Germany, concerning the refusal to allow that company to correct an application 
for free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances (‘the emission allow-
ances’) for the third trading period 2013–2020. The national court hearing the case 
wanted to know, in essence, whether the Directive precludes national law setting 
a limitation period upon the expiry of which the applicant is deprived of any pos-
sibility to correct or complete his application.
Downloaded from Brill.com03/04/2019 09:36:52AM
via Universiteit Groningen
Squintani




41 In that regard, it should be noted that Article 7(8) of Decision 2011/278 
specifies that, where data is missing, Member States are to require the op-
erator to justify any ‘lack of data’ and to substitute ‘partly available data’ 
with conservative estimates, without, however, establishing a procedure 
that would make it possible to correct or supplement the information 
provided. Similarly, while Article 8 of that decision prohibits Member 
States from accepting data that have not been verified as satisfactory by 
a verifier, that provision does not establish a time limit or a procedure for 
correcting unsatisfactory data.
42 In those circumstances, in the absence of eu rules concerning the proce-
dural requirements attaching to the submission and examination of an 
application for free allocation of emission allowances, it is, according to 
established case-law, for the domestic legal system of each Member State 
to determine those requirements in accordance with the principle of pro-
cedural autonomy provided, however, that those requirements are not 
less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (princi-
ple of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the eu legal order 
(principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 20 
October 2016, Danqua, C-429/15, eu:c:2016:789, paragraph 29).
55 It follows that there is nothing in the documents before the Court to sug-
gest that such a mandatory time limit is liable to render impossible in 
practice or excessively difficult the submission of an application for free 
allocation of emission allowances for the purpose of exercising the right 
to obtain free emission allowances under Article 10a of Directive 2003/87 
and Decision 2011/278.
 On Direct and Indirect Emissions under the ets Directive
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 28 February 2018 in Case C-577/16 – 
Trinseo Deutschland Anlagengesellschaft mbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1 of the 
ets Directive and Commission Decision 2011/278/eu of 27 April 2011 determining 
transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allow-
ances. The request has been made in proceedings between Trinseo Deutschland 
Anlagengesellschaft mbH (‘Trinseo’) and Germany, concerning the refusal to 
 allocate greenhouse gas emission allowances free of charge to an installation for 
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the production of polycarbonate, on the ground that that installation obtains the 
steam needed for that production from a plant which is operated, on the same 
site, by another company, Dow Deutschland Anlagengesellschaft, which is sub-
ject to the emission allowance trading scheme established by the Directive. The 
 national court hearing the case wanted to know, in essence, whether Trinseo’s in-
stallation falls within the scope of the ets Directive.
 Key Findings
49 In the present case, it is apparent from the evidence submitted to the 
Court, and it is common ground between all the interested parties who 
have participated in these proceedings, that an installation for the pro-
duction of polymers, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
obtains the heat needed for polymerisation from a third-party installa-
tion does not itself generate releases of CO2 into the atmosphere, only 
the production of heat by that latter installation giving rise to such re-
leases. The polymerisation process does not release CO2 since carbon, as 
the Netherlands Government explained, is specifically necessary for the 
production of polymers, such as polycarbonate.
50 It follows that the production of polymers by an installation, such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings, which does not produce, in an integrat-
ed manner, the heat needed for polymerisation, does not generate direct 
emissions of CO2.
51 Or, in the absence of such emissions, an activity, even if it is referred to 
in Annex i to Directive 2003/87, cannot fall within the scope of that di-
rective and, therefore, of the emissions allowance trading scheme estab-
lished by that directive.
53 Trinseo and the Commission submit, however, that emissions arising 
from the production of polymers should include ‘indirect’ emissions 
from the production of heat by the third-party installation supplying that 
heat for the purposes of polymerisation. In their view, that approach is 
consistent with the objective pursued by Directive 2003/87, inasmuch as 
it would make it possible to encourage investments aimed at reducing 
energy consumption. They argue that that approach is also supported by 
Article 10a of that directive and Article 3(c) and recitals 6 and 21 of De-
cision 2011/278, which provide for the free allocation of emission allow-
ances to the installation which uses the heat and not to the installation 
which produces it. Thus, they contend that it is apparent from Article 1(1) 
of Decision 2013/448, read in conjunction with point E of Annex i to that 
decision and construed in the light of recitals 16 and 17 of that decision, 
that polymerisation installations, rather than the heat supplier, must be 
allocated emission allowances free of charge. They state that Annex i to 
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Decision 2011/278 moreover sets benchmarks for products manufactured 
exclusively in that type of installation.
54 That interpretation cannot be accepted, however.
57 It is thus clearly apparent from that provision that only emissions arising 
directly from the activity carried out by the installation itself producing 
the heat can be taken into account in order to determine whether that 
activity falls within the emissions allowance trading scheme.
58 It follows that CO2 emissions arising from the activity of producing 
heat justify solely the inclusion in that scheme of installations that are 
the source of those emissions, such as, in the present case, the third-
party installation supplying heat to the installation at issue in the main 
proceedings.
60 It is thus clearly apparent from that wording that an operator which im-
ports heat from a third-party installation cannot rely on the emissions 
generated by the latter.
 On the Duty to Perform an Environmental Impact Assessment after 
a Project Has Been Realized
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 28 February 2018 in Case C-117/17 – 
Comune di Castelbellino v Regione Marche
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Directive 
2011/92/eu on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment. The request has been made in proceedings between, on the 
one hand, the Comune di Castelbellino (municipality of Castelbellino, Italy) and, 
on the other hand, the Regione Marche (Marche Region, Italy), and other Italian 
authorities, concerning the decision by which the Marche Region took the view 
that there was no need to examine whether it was necessary to subject the project 
of Società Agricola 4 C S. S. (‘4 C’), by which it sought to increase the capacity of 
a plant for the production of electricity from biogas, to an environmental impact 
assessment. The increase in question already had been carried out at the time of 
the municipality of Castelbellino’s request. The national court wanted to know, in 
essence, whether an eia was still required.
 Key Findings
30 Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the Court has previously 
held, in paragraph 43 of the judgment of 26 July 2017, Comune di Cor-
ridonia and Others (C-196/16 and C-197/16, eu:c:2017:589), that, in the 
Downloaded from Brill.com03/04/2019 09:36:52AM
via Universiteit Groningen
 229Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
journal for european environmental & planning law 15 (2018) 219-239
<UN>
event of failure to carry out an eia required by eu law, Member States 
must nullify the unlawful consequences of that failure, and that eu law 
does not preclude regularisation through the conducting of an impact 
 assessment after the plant concerned has been constructed and has 
entered into operation, subject to the twofold condition that, first, na-
tional rules allowing for that regularisation do not provide the parties 
concerned with an opportunity to circumvent the rules of eu law or to 
dispense with applying them, and second, an assessment carried out for 
regularisation purposes is not conducted solely in respect of the plant’s 
future environmental impact, but also takes into account its environ-
mental impact from the time of its completion.
32 As a result, under those conditions, where a project has not been subject 
to a preliminary assessment of the need for an eia pursuant to provisions 
incompatible with Directive 2011/92, eu law does not preclude the com-
petent authorities carrying out an assessment of the project, even after 
its completion, for the purpose of establishing whether or not it must 
undergo an eia, where appropriate, on the basis of new national legisla-
tion, provided that legislation is compatible with the directive.
 On the Concept of ‘Environmental Law’ under the Aarhus 
Regulation in Relation to Genetically Modified Organisms
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 14 March 2018 in Case 
T-33/16 – TestBioTech eV v European Commission
 Subject Matter
This case concerns an action for annulment of the letter from the Commissioner 
for Health and Food Safety of 16 November 2015 rejecting an application for in-
ternal review, based on Article 10 of Regulation (ec) No 1367/2006 (the Aarhus 
Regulation), of implementing decisions authorising the placing on the market of 
the genetically modified soybeans mon 87769, mon 87705 and 305423.
 Key Findings
69 It follows that environmental law, within the meaning of Regulation No 
1367/2006, covers, in this case, any provision of eu legislation, concern-
ing the regulation of genetically modified organisms, that has the objec-
tive of dealing with a risk, to human or animal health, that originates 
in those genetically modified organisms or in environmental factors that 
may have effects on those organisms when they are cultivated or bred in 
the natural environment. That finding is no less applicable in  situations 
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where the genetically modified organisms have not been cultivated with-
in the European Union.
76 It follows that concerns with respect to human and animal health, ex-
pressed in relation to the lack of appropriate monitoring in this case, also 
fall within the scope of Article 10 of Regulation No 1367/2006.
77 Consequently, the Commission was wrong to conclude, in the contested 
decision, that the arguments set out in paragraph 70 above could not be 
examined within the framework of Article 10 of Regulation No 1367/2006. 
That finding is not called into question by the other arguments submitted 
by the Commission and by the interveners.
89 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the Commis-
sion, in finding that the greater part of the complaints raised by the ap-
plicant in its request for internal review did not fall within the scope of 
environmental law, erred in law. Consequently, the first plea in law must 
be upheld and the contested decision must be annulled in its entirety, 
there being no need to examine the applicant’s second plea in law.
 On the Concept of ‘Polluter’ under the Packaging and Packaging 
Waste Directive
Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 15 March 2018 in Case C-104/17 – sc 
Cali Esprou srl v Administraţia Fondului pentru Mediu
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 15 of 
European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/ec on packaging and packag-
ing waste. The request has been made in proceedings between sc Cali Esprou srl 
and the Administraţia Fondului pentru Mediu (Environment Fund Administra-
tion, Romania; ‘afm’) concerning the lawfulness of a contribution imposed on 
Cali Esprou by afm, calculated on the basis of the packaging which it placed on 
the Romanian market in 2013 and 2014. Cali Esprou imported the packaging with-
out altering it. The national court hearing the case wanted to know, in essence, 
whether the lack-of-alteration aspect precluded Cali Esprou to be considered as 
being a polluter for the purposes of the Directive.
 Key Findings
22 In that regard, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the ‘polluter-
pays’ principle, referred to in Article 15 and the 29th recital of Directive 
94/62 requires, according to that recital, that ‘all those involved in the 
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production, use, import and distribution of packaging and packaged 
products become more aware of the place of packaging waste genera-
tion’ and ‘agree to assume liability’. That principle does not cover only 
those directly responsible for the production of waste, but has a broader 
scope. It also covers those who contribute to that production of waste, 
which includes importers and distributors of packaged products (see, by 
analogy, judgment of 30 March 2017, vg Čistoća, C-335/16, eu:c:2017:242, 
paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
43 It follows from all of the foregoing that Article 15 of Directive 94/62 and 
the ‘polluter-pays’ principle which it implements do not preclude na-
tional legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
imposes a contribution on an economic operator which does not make 
any alteration to the packaging it places on the market, calculated on the 
basis of the difference in weight between, on the one hand, the quantity 
of packaging waste corresponding to the minimum targets for energy re-
covery and recovery by recycling and, on the other, the quantity of pack-
aging waste actually recovered or recycled.
 On the Costs of Proceedings of a Premature Challenge under the 
Aarhus Convention
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 Mach 2018 in Case C-470/16 – 
North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Ltd, Maura Sheehy v An Bord Pleanála
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 11 
of the eia Directive and of the Aarhus Convention. The request has been made 
in proceedings between North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Limited (nepp) 
and Maura Sheehy, on the one hand, and An Bord Pleanála, and other Irish 
 authorities, on the other, concerning the determination of costs associated with 
the rejection of an application for judicial review of the development consent pro-
cess for the installation of an electricity interconnector. On 4 March 2016, nepp 
and Ms Sheehy sought to challenge the development consent process, in par-
ticular by attempting to prevent the oral hearing being held. To that end, they 
made an  application for leave to seek judicial review and for an interlocutory in-
junction. The  application was dismissed and the national court hearing the case 
wanted to know, in essence, how to allocate the about 500.000 Euro costs made in 
that context and what obligation derives from eu law and the Aarhus Convention 
in that regard.
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31 It follows that, where national procedural law provides that leave must be 
sought before bringing a challenge covered by the requirement laid down 
by Article 11(4) of Directive 2011/92, the costs incurred in a procedure for 
obtaining that leave must also be covered.
33 It is irrelevant, in that regard, that the application for leave to apply for ju-
dicial review was submitted in the course of a process which may lead to 
the grant of development consent, and not against a final decision closing 
that process. As pointed out by the Advocate General in points 101 to 108 
of his Opinion, Directive 2011/92 neither requires nor prohibits that chal-
lenges covered by the guarantee against prohibitive expense be brought 
against decisions definitively closing a consent process, given the wide 
range of different environmental decision-making processes, but only 
stipulates that Member States must determine the stage at which a chal-
lenge may be brought.
44 It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the second question is 
that, where an applicant raises both pleas alleging infringement of the 
rules on public participation in decision-making in environmental mat-
ters and pleas alleging infringement of other rules, the requirement that 
certain judicial procedures not be prohibitively expensive laid down 
in Article 11(4) of Directive 2011/92 applies only to the costs relating to 
the part of the challenge alleging infringement of the rules on public 
participation.
58 It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the fourth and fifth ques-
tions is that Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention must be inter-
preted as meaning that, in order to ensure effective judicial protection in 
the fields covered by eu environmental law, the requirement that certain 
judicial procedures not be prohibitively expensive applies to the part of 
a challenge that would not be covered by that requirement, as it results, 
under Directive 2011/92, from the answer given to the second question, 
in so far as the applicant seeks, by that challenge, to ensure that national 
environmental law is complied with. Those provisions do not have direct 
effect, but it is for the national court to give an interpretation of national 
procedural law which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with 
them.
65 Accordingly, the answer to the sixth and seventh questions is that a 
Member State cannot derogate from the requirement that certain judi-
cial procedures not be prohibitively expensive, laid down by Article 9(4) 
of the Aarhus Convention and Article 11(4) of Directive 2011/92, where a 
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challenge is deemed frivolous or vexatious, or where there is no link be-
tween the alleged breach of national environmental law and damage to 
the environment.
 On the Compatibility with eu Law of Taxes Imposed upon 
Emission Allowances under the ets Directive
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 12 April 2018 in Case C-302/17 – ppc 
Power a.s. v Finančné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1 of 
the ets Directive. The request has been made in proceedings between ppc Power 
a.s. and the Daňový úrad pre vybrané daňové subjekty (Tax administration for 
certain taxpayers, Slovakia; ‘the du’) concerning the advance payment of tax 
on  greenhouse gas emission allowances allocated free of charge which have not 
been used or have been transferred. du levied a tax on emission allowances for 
the years 2011 and 2012 at a rate of 80%. The national court hearing the case 
wanted to know, in essence, whether such a tax is compatible with the goals of 
the Directive.
 Key Findings
25 It is therefore necessary for the proper functioning of that system that a 
levy taken by a Member State from the economic value of those emission 
allowances should not diminish the incentive to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to the point of removing it entirely (see, to that effect, judg-
ment of 17 October 2013, Iberdrola and Others, C-566/11, C-567/11, C-580/11, 
C-591/11, C-620/11 and C-640/11, eu:c:2013:660, paragraph 58).
26 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that the Slovak tax 
at issue in the main proceedings affects up to 80% of the value of the 
greenhouse gas emission allowances allocated free of charge which have 
not been used or have been sold.
27 By eliminating virtually all of the economic value of emission allowances, 
the tax amounts to a negation of the incentive mechanisms underpin-
ning the emission allowance trading system and, consequently, to the 
removal of the incentives intended to promote the reduction of green-
house gas emissions. Thus deprived of 80% of the economic value of the 
emission allowances, undertakings lose almost all incentive to invest in 
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measures to reduce their emissions which enable them to derive profit 
from the sale of their unused allowances.
28 Thus, it must be held that that tax has the effect of neutralising the prin-
ciple of the greenhouse gas emission allowances allocated free of charge 
provided for in Article 10 of Directive 2003/87, and of undermining the 
objectives pursued by that directive.
 On the Relevance of Mitigation Measures under the Preliminary 
Screening for Appropriate Assessment under the Habitats Directive
Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 12 April 2018 in Case C-323/17 – 
People Over Wind, Peter Sweetman v Coillte Teoranta
 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 6(3) 
of the Habitats Directive. The request has been made in proceedings brought by 
People Over Wind, an environmental ngo, and by Peter Sweetman against Coillte 
Teoranta (‘Coillte’), a company owned by the Irish State that operates in the for-
estry sector, relating to the works necessary to lay the cable connecting a wind 
farm to the electricity grid. Authorisation for that project was granted without an 
appropriate assessment under Article 6(3) of the Directive, as mitigation mea-
sures were considered during the preliminary screening. The national court hear-
ing the case wanted to know, in essence, whether this is possible.
 Key Findings
25 Thus, Article 6 of the Habitats Directive divides measures into three cat-
egories, namely conservation measures, preventive measures and com-
pensatory measures, provided for in Article 6(1), (2) and (4) respectively. 
It is clear from the wording of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive that that 
provision contains no reference to any concept of ‘mitigating measure’ 
(see, to that effect, judgment of 21 July 2016, Orleans and Others, C-387/15 
and C-388/15, eu:c:2016:583, paragraphs 57 and 58 and the case-law 
cited).
26 It follows that, as is apparent from the reasoning of the request for a pre-
liminary ruling, that the measures which the referring court describes as 
‘mitigating measures’, and which Coillte refers to as ‘protective measures’, 
should be understood as denoting measures that are intended to avoid or 
reduce the harmful effects of the envisaged project on the site concerned.
37 Taking account of such measures at the screening stage would be liable 
to compromise the practical effect of the Habitats Directive in general, 
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and the assessment stage in particular, as the latter stage would be de-
prived of its purpose and there would be a risk of circumvention of that 
stage, which constitutes, however, an essential safeguard provided for by 
the directive.
39 It is, moreover, from Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive that persons 
such as the applicants in the main proceedings derive in particular a 
right to participate in a procedure for the adoption of a decision relating 
to an application for authorisation of a plan or project likely to have a 
 significant effect on the environment (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 
November 2016, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie vlk, C-243/15, eu:c:2016:838, 
paragraph 49).
40 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question 
referred is that Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive must be interpreted 
as meaning that, in order to determine whether it is necessary to carry 
out, subsequently, an appropriate assessment of the implications, for a 
site concerned, of a plan or project, it is not appropriate, at the screening 
stage, to take account of the measures intended to avoid or reduce the 
harmful effects of the plan or project on that site.
 On the Protection of ‘Puszcza Białowieska’ Natura 2000 Site
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 17 April 2018 in Case C-441/17 – 
 European Commission v Republic of Poland
On this case see the casenote by Ludwig Krämer in this jeepl issue.
 Subject Matter
By its application, the European Commission requests the Court to declare that 
the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Habitats and 
Birds Directives by allowing forest management measures resulting in the cutting 
of several secular trees protected under eu law. The Court agreed with all com-
plains made by the Commission.
 Judgment
The Court of Justice
Declares that the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under:
− Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/eec of 21 May 1992 on the conserva-
tion of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, as amended by Council 
Directive 2013/17/eu of 13 May 2013, by adopting an appendix to the forest 
management plan for the Białowieża Forest District without ascertaining 
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that that appendix would not adversely affect the integrity of the site of 
Community importance and special protection area plc200004 Puszcza 
Białowieska;
− Article 6(1) of Directive 92/43, as amended by Directive 2013/17, and Article 
4(1) and (2) of Directive 2009/147/ec of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, as amend-
ed by Directive 2013/17, by failing to establish the necessary conservation 
measures corresponding to the ecological requirements of (i) the natural 
habitat types listed in Annex i to Directive 92/43, as amended by Directive 
2013/17, and the species listed in Annex ii to that directive, and (ii) the spe-
cies of birds listed in Annex i to Directive 2009/147, as amended by Direc-
tive 2013/17, and the regularly occurring migratory species not listed in that 
annex, for which the site of Community importance and special protection 
area PLC200004 Puszcza Białowieska were designated;
− Article 12(1)(a) and (d) of Directive 92/43, as amended by Directive 2013/17, 
by failing to guarantee the strict protection of certain saproxylic beetles, 
namely the goldstreifiger beetle (Buprestis splendens), the flat bark beetle 
(Cucujus cinnaberinus), the false darkling beetle (Phryganophilus ruficollis) 
and Pytho kolwensis, listed in Annex iv to that directive, that is to say, by 
failing effectively to prohibit the deliberate killing or disturbance of those 
beetles or the deterioration or destruction of their breeding sites in the 
Białowieża Forest District; and
− Article 5(b) and (d) of Directive 2009/147, as amended by Directive 2013/17, 
by failing to guarantee the protection of the species of birds referred 
to in  Article 1 of that directive, including, in particular, the pygmy owl 
( Glaucidium passerinum), the boreal owl (Aegolius funereus), the white-
backed woodpecker (Dendrocopos leucotos) and the three-toed woodpecker 
(Picoides tridactylus), that is to say, by failing to ensure that they will not be 
killed or disturbed during the period of breeding and rearing and that their 
nests or eggs will not be deliberately destroyed, damaged or removed in the 
Białowieża Forest District;
 Editor’s Appraisal of the Reported Case Law
By looking at the judgments reported in the selected period two themes can be 
brought to the fore: (a) the persistent need of clarity about the ets Directive 
and (b) the steady but slow progresses in the improvement of the effectiveness 
of the eu framework for the enforcement of environmental law. Moreover, it 
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is striking to see that several key concepts of eu environmental law are still in 
need of clarification.
To begin with the latter, three cases among those reviewed in this appraisal 
make me think about what Eliantonio and Grashof wrote in their article ‘Wir 
müssen reden! – We Need to Have a Serious Talk!’, published in this journal in 
2016.2 That contribution highlights the shortcomings in the ability of the eu 
full system of remedies (with focus in particular on Articles 258 and 267 tfeu) 
to clarify the meaning of eu (environmental) law. The Municipality of Castel-
bellino case (C-117/17), the new People Over Wind and Sweetman case (C-323/17) 
and the Cali Esprou case (C-104/17) all concern long-standing pieces of eu 
environmental law established four lustra ago, or more. Still the meaning of 
the concept of ‘polluter’ under the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive 
(adopted in 1994), of the obligation to perform an ‘environmental impact as-
sessment’ under the eia Directive (adopted in 1985) and of the obligation to 
perform an appropriate assessment under the Habitats Directive (adopted in 
1992) are unclear. This makes me wonder whether eu law is not in need of a 
serious rethinking about the instruments available to ensure a uniform inter-
pretation and application of eu law. How many more cases and years do we 
need to wait before legal certainty is ensured in these fields? And what about 
legal certainty in newer fields, such as the ets one?
As indicated above, the ets Directive was one of the main themes discussed 
in the case law of the Court of Justice analyzed in this appraisal, with four cases 
presented in this regard. It is true that the Directive has been amended in March 
this year,3 but these cases all deal with long-standing provisions under the Di-
rective, such as the concept of ‘emission’ covered by the ets  Directive. Indeed, 
the ineos Köln case (C-58/17) clarifies that emissions coming from the com-
bustion of liquid waste cannot be allocated for free as this would  incentivize 
the combustion of liquid waste, leading to more greenhouse gases emissions 
than if that waste is not combusted. Furthermore, according to the Trinseo 
case (C-577/16), indirect emissions, i.e. emissions emitted by an installation 
but actually generated by another one, fall outside the scope of the  Directive 
2 M. Eliantonio and F. Grashof, Wir müssen reden! – We Need to Have a Serious Talk! The In-
teraction between the Infringement Proceedings and the Preliminary Reference Procedure in 
 Ensuring Compliance with eu Environmental Standards: A Case Study of Trianel, Altrip and 
Commission v Germany, jeepl 2016/3-4, pp. 325–349.
3 Directive (eu) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 
amending Directive 2003/87/ec to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low- 
carbon investments, and Decision (eu) 2015/1814, oj (2019) L 76/3.
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either. This means that only the installation generating the emission is cov-
ered by the emission-trading scheme (and thus entitled to free allowances if 
available). The other two cases on the ets Directive dealt by in this appraisal 
concerns the discretionary powers of the Member States under the Directive. 
In this regard, the ineos Köln ii case (C-572/16) shows that Germany correctly 
used the discretionary powers left open under the Directive as regards the pro-
cedure to correct errors in the application form for free allowances. Differently 
the ppc Power case (C-302/17) shows that taxing greenhouse gases allowances 
granted for free and which have not been used or have been transferred at 80% 
of their value is a breach of the Directive. This latter judgment makes me think 
about a recurring discussion in the context of the ets Directive, that on more 
stringent protective measures.4 This case did not discuss this aspect, at least 
not explicitly. Still, in abstracto, taxes on greenhouse gases allowances could be 
a useful additional tool to ensure that participants to the ets Directive pay a 
price for their emissions, which is high enough to ensure compliance with the 
ets Directive goals. The question is thus whether taxes could be accepted as a 
form of more stringent protective measure under the Directive. Albeit implic-
itly, this case shows that the Court of Justice is willing to review such an addi-
tional mechanism, and it will do so by first looking at whether such additional 
measure contributes to the achievement of the goals of the Directive. In the 
present case, this step led to a negative answer, as the tax only applied upon 
greenhouse gases allowances that were not used to compensate emissions or 
transferred. It thus diminished the incentive to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions to the point of removing it entirely, according to the Court. The question 
remains thus open about what would have the Court decided if the tax applied 
in all cases and, more generally, how the Court will consider other kinds of 
more stringent protective measures, such as emission performance standards 
or emission limit values.
As regards the second theme discussed in this appraisal, i.e. the steady but 
slow progresses in the improvement of the effectiveness of the eu framework 
4 In particular, J. Scott, Multi-Level Governance of Climate Change, cclr 2011/1, p. 27; D.  Wyatt & 
R. Macrory in a ‘legal advice’ (2010): Does the eu’s Proposed Directive On Industrial Emis-
sions (ippc) Preclude Member States From Imposing Emission Limits for Co2 Under Na-
tional Rules Other Than Those Implementing the Proposed Directive?, no longer available 
on the internet; L. Squintani, J.M. Holwerda & K.J. de Graaf, ‘Regulating greenhouse gas emis-
sions from eu ets installations: what room is left for the member states?’, in: M. Peeters & 
M. Stallworthy, Climate Law in eu Member States, towards National Legislation for Climate 
Protection (2012 ee), pp. 67–88 and, more recently, but in Dutch, T.J. Thurlings, Verhandel-
bare emissierechten in broeikasgassen, Ph.D. Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen, 2017, 
pp. 34–37.
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for the enforcement of environmental law, the appeal case in Binca Seafoods 
(C-268/16 P) is surely welcome. The fact that the Court corrected the  General 
Court as regards whether decreases of the concurring position of an undertak-
ing due to eu measures suffices to establish an interest in proceeding against 
that eu measures, a question answered in the negative by the General Court, 
prevents, indeed, further worsening the position of individuals under the al-
ready highly contested annulment procedure.5 Similarly, the infringing pro-
cedure against Greece (C-328/16) for non-compliance with the judgment of 
the Court in the context of urban waste water management and that against 
Poland (C-336/16) in the context of air quality are welcome developments. 
 Although, the latter case shows how long an infringement procedure can 
take to conclude, the Commission had sent the first notice in 2009, it fits well 
within the renewed attention of the Commission on this topic.6 The most 
interesting developments in the context of the enforcement of eu environ-
mental law, though, are, on the one hand, those taking place under the Protect 
case ( C-664/15) and the Pylon case (C-470/16) as regards the meaning of the 
 Aarhus rights to access to justice. On the other hand, the infringement proce-
dure against Poland (C-41/17), as regards the Puszcza Białowieska Natura 2000 
site, and the related court order in the interim procedure7 show an interesting 
 development about the arsenal at the disposal of the Commission in the con-
text of Article 258 tfeu. To Christoph Sobotta the honor to open the discussion 
on the first two cases, and to Ludwig Krämer that of opening the discussion on 
the latter ones. Enjoy reading!
5 M. van Wolferen, The Limits to the cjeu’s Interpretation of Locus Standi, a Theoretical Frame-
work, jcer, 2016(4), pp. 915–930 with further references.
6 As announced in March 2018, the Commission has started an infringement procedure against 
several Member States, see for the announcement http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP 
-18-3450_en.htm (accessed May 2018).
7 Case C-441/17 R, European Commission v Republic of Poland, ecli:eu:c:2017:877.
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